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Thank you very much, Stephen Burbank. It is a great opportunity to 
join you today at the University of Pennsylvania on the seventy-fifth 
anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Every senator wakes up 
every morning eager to go out and deliver an impassioned speech on the 
subject of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. You laugh, but you are here 
to listen to a speech on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I imagine that many law students who arrive here at this famous law 
school in Philadelphia, the city that hosted our nation’s Constitutional 
Convention, dream of litigating epic constitutional cases before the United 
States Supreme Court. For the students here, perhaps learning the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure may not be very high on your priority list, but you 
 
† United States Senator for Rhode Island. This text is an adaptation from the opening address 
delivered on November 15, 2013, at The Federal Rules at 75, a symposium hosted at the University of 
Pennsylvania by the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 
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will find out—as I found out—that command of procedure is essential to a 
litigator’s prowess. 
More broadly, the way we fashion procedure is pivotal to the quality of 
justice our system provides. Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas said it well 
when he wrote that, “Procedure is the bone structure of a democratic 
society.”1 I’m going to ask you to remember two things from this speech. 
That’s the first one: “[p]rocedure is the bone structure of a democratic 
society.” In short, procedure is power. 
Today, I want to focus on the way that civil procedure affects the power 
of an important political institution within our system of self-government—
and that is the civil jury.  
Let’s start, in this historic place, with some history. The earliest tendrils 
of the jury system appeared in England in the twelfth century. By the 
fifteenth century, civil juries had blossomed to the point where independent 
persons gathered together and heard witness testimony brought by opposing 
counsel. When the earliest American settlers came to this land, they 
transplanted juries here: 1624 into Virginia, 1628 into Massachusetts, 1677 
into New Jersey, and 1682 into Pennsylvania. If you do the math, that makes 
last year the 330th anniversary of the Pennsylvania civil jury. 
Civil juries provided a treasured means of self-government to early 
Americans as they chafed under colonial rule. Efforts by the English 
government to deny that right helped foment the American Revolution. 
When our original Constitution was silent on the civil jury, Americans 
sounded the alarm and the Seventh Amendment2 was promptly sent to the 
states in the Bill of Rights. 
Alexander Hamilton described this in The Federalist No. 83, where he 
stated that:  
 The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree 
in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; 
or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former 
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very 
palladium of free government.3   
The civil jury: the very palladium of free government.  
 
1 ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 60 (1968).  
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall 
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law.”). 
3 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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Colonial Americans understood, like Sir William Blackstone, that 
“[e]very new tribunal erected, for the decision of facts, without the inter-
vention of a jury . . . is a step towards establishing aristocracy, the most 
oppressive of absolute governments.”4 The founders intended the civil jury 
to serve as an institutional check on that power by giving ordinary American 
people direct control over one vital element of government.  
The civil jury is not just a fact-finding appendage of a court. It has an 
institutional and structural purpose. Alexis de Tocqueville observed that the 
jury should be understood as a “political institution” and “one form of the 
sovereignty of the people.”5 Sir William Blackstone explained that trial by 
jury “preserves in the hands of the people that share, which they ought to 
have in the administration of public justice, and prevents the encroachments 
of the more powerful and wealthy citizens.”6 That’s the second line I want 
you to remember: the civil jury “prevents the encroachments of the more 
powerful and wealthy citizens.”  
Uniquely, in a Constitution that is largely devoted to protecting the  
individual against the power of the state, the civil jury is designed to protect 
the individual against other more powerful and wealthy individuals. 
Today, the civil jury remains a political institution. It fosters civic  
engagement. It educates citizens about the workings of their government. It 
knits together people from all walks of life. It dissolves power down to the 
people. It offers a final check on abuse, when other institutions of government 
are compromised. 
The jury trial has never been the exclusive method for concluding litiga-
tion in federal courts, but it is now close to vanishing. When the Civil Rules 
were adopted, around eighteen percent of cases were resolved by either a 
jury or a bench trial. Now, less than two percent of cases reach a jury or a 
bench trial. Most litigants do not have a reasonable prospect of presenting 
their claims to a jury of their peers. 
Some reasons for this trend are practical. The economics of the modern 
legal practice force litigants into early settlement. Judges add to the pressure 
with concerns about managing and expediting their dockets. But some 
changes come via the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Recent amendments and interpretations governing pleading standards 
and motions to dismiss, class action lawsuits, summary judgment, and case 
management procedures have all narrowed the gateway to a jury trial. For 
 
4 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380.  
5 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 363 (Francis Bowen ed., Henry 
Reeve trans., 7th ed. 1874).  
6 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *380.  
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example, in Iqbal7 and Twombly,8 the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 12, 
which governs motions to dismiss, to eliminate traditional notice pleading 
and make it far easier for corporate defendants to dismiss cases. This 
prevents plaintiffs from reaching discovery and ultimately presenting their 
case to the jury. The Court invented a new “plausibility” standard, whereby 
a judge screens a complaint to make his own assessment of the facts and 
inferences. As Justice Stevens reminded us in his dissent in Twombly, 
“[u]nder the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal Rules, the idea was 
not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them in.”9 More and 
more, it seems, the trend in judicial interpretation of the Federal Rules is, in 
fact, to keep litigants out. 
For class actions, the Court interpreted Rule 23 to make it more difficult 
for a certified class of plaintiffs to reach a civil jury and prove a pattern of 
discrimination. In Wal-Mart v. Dukes,10 the Roberts Court changed the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), making it far more difficult for 
individual citizens who had been injured to join together, bring their case 
before a jury, and hold corporate wrongdoers accountable for the  
small-denomination, but large-scale, frauds that are the stuff of class actions. 
This was an epic change. 
In summary judgment, we are still living with the Celotex trilogy from 
the 1980s.11 According to the text of Rule 56, summary judgment shall be 
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In 
Celotex itself, the Court held that the moving party need not produce 
evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but merely 
show “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s 
case.”12 The burden shifted a little there. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
the Court held the same standard of proof required at trial would also apply 
at the summary judgment stage.13 Since the plaintiff usually bears the 
burden of trial, the burden shifted again. Then, in Matsushita v. Zenith, the 
Court held the party with the burden of proof at trial must create more than 
a “metaphysical doubt” about the relevant facts, solidifying the shift.14  
 
7 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
8 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
9 Id. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
10 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
11 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).  
12 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.  
13 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-56.  
14 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. 
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Together, these changes made it easier for courts to grant summary 
judgment, and courts took notice. Federal courts have cited this trilogy in 
astounding numbers. Anderson has been cited more than 175,000 times, 
Celotex, more than 165,000 times, and Matsushita more than 80,000 times. 
Amendments to Rule 16, which covers pretrial conferences, case sched-
uling, and case management, have steered case management more toward 
settlement than toward trial. This preference for settlement is going to get 
stronger as we have more budget problems in Washington and we have less 
money to support the activities of our judiciary. 
Twenty-five years ago, when the University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rules, 15  Professor 
Maurice Rosenberg said that the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 had “helped 
shift the center of gravity from the trial to the pretrial stages” of civil 
litigation. 16  These amendments cemented the judge's managerial role. 
Professor Rosenberg also noted that the word “management,” for the first 
time, appeared in the Civil Rules in those 1983 amendments.17 
Finally, while not a rule, the growing practice of judges tolerating “paper 
blizzard” defense strategies and accepting the accompanying delay in access 
to a jury rewards defendants who can bankroll aggressive and imaginative 
defense pretrial strategies and “starve out” the plaintiff. 
It need not have been this way. Congress intended that changes to the 
Civil Rules would take place through the process laid out by the Rules 
Enabling Act. Instead, as I have described, many of the most significant 
changes in civil procedure—the amendments to Rule 16 aside—have been 
made by judicial fiat. The Rules Enabling Act, passed in 1934 and amended 
in 1988, requires advisory committees convened by the courts to develop 
amendments for the civil rules through a public rulemaking process.18 The 
courts then decide whether to transmit such amendments to Congress, 
which has seven months to modify or reject those amendments. This 
process is intended to reflect the considered views of litigants and judges, to 
establish a thoughtful record, and to preserve a meaningful role for Con-
gress. Decisions such as Iqbal and Twombly not only implicitly overruled 
precedents, such as Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,19 but also bypassed this rulemaking 
 
15 See Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938–1988, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (1989).  
16 Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2197, 2203 (1989). 
17 Id. at 2199.  
18 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)). 
19 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).  
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process and deprived Congress and the public of the roles reserved for them 
in the Rules Enabling Act.  
The result has been rule changes based on judicial hunch—for example, 
that there is widespread plaintiff discovery abuse—rather than on a com-
prehensive record of evidence. Congress established the Rules Enabling Act 
process exactly to avoid this sort of policymaking by judicial guesswork. It is 
frustrating when Congress passes laws intended to provide civil judicial 
relief for injured parties before civil juries, only to find that courts curtail 
that relief through reinterpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Unfortunately, as the lack of a legislative response to the Twombly and 
Iqbal cases demonstrates, Congress itself has some blame to bear here. 
Congress is not always well-positioned to respond to judicial policymaking. 
Still, the present structural challenges should not dissuade us from fighting 
for a litigant to have a realistic opportunity to present a factual dispute to a 
civil jury. The Founding Fathers would be astounded to see where we have 
come. 
Congress could help revive the jury trial through the rulemaking process 
with a greater substantive focus on jury access and by including diverse 
viewpoints on the relevant advisory committees so judicial docket management 
and settlement concerns do not trump all else.  
We can also accomplish this through legislation that overturns specific 
cases that limit jury access. Congress could consider wholesale procedural 
changes, such as the creation of a new procedural track enabling simple 
cases to move more readily to jury trial. And, it would help if we confirmed 
more judges with a proper understanding of the political and historical role 
of the civil jury. 
Our goal—like the purpose of the Seventh Amendment—should be to 
reestablish the special constitutional institution that gives an injured 
individual the opportunity to have his or her day in court in front of a group 
of peers. We must remember the constitutional role of the jury, the political 
role of the jury, the educational role of the jury, and the empowering civic 
role of the jury. In doing so, we will be truer to our democracy and to our 
history. 
Let me close with a more contentious point. This gradual suffocation of 
the civil jury is neither random nor coincidental. Blackstone warned, in my 
second favorite quote that I asked you to remember, that the civil jury 
would be a thorn in the side of the more wealthy and powerful, of those who 
are used to special treatment. There, in front of the civil jury, they have to 
stand annoyingly equal before the law. As a body that “prevents the  
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encroachments of the more powerful and wealthy,”20 the civil jury inevitably 
provokes their annoyance, their enmity, and their opposition. 
In America nowadays, our most wealthy and powerful beings are corpo-
rations, and juries are indeed a thorn in their side. Corporate influence 
suffuses the legislative and executive branches. Corporate lobbyists, cam-
paign contributions, and, thanks to Citizens United,21 unlimited election 
spending are all big bucks, and that money is not spent for nothing. Ideas 
that corporate power resists can be banished. Reforms that corporations 
object to can be stymied. Tax and other arrangements that secure corporate 
profits can be achieved. The legislative and executive branches can provide 
sweet deals for big corporations. 
But that whole tide of corporate money and influence comes to a crashing 
stop against the hard square corners of the jury box. There, the proud and 
mighty must stand even before the law, with some menial person they have 
injured. CEOs and important officials might be obliged to testify. And 
rigging the game doesn’t work well. Tampering with legislators and regulators 
is a constant, even licensed, corporate activity, but tampering with a jury is a 
crime. The jury is, indeed, a thorn in the side of corporations comfortable 
astride the rest of government. 
It should be no surprise that corporations spread a mythology of greedy 
trial lawyers, runaway juries, abusive discovery, and preposterous verdicts. It 
should be no surprise that corporations seek the appointment of “business-
friendly” judges. It should be no surprise that an already “business-
friendly” Congress and those “business-friendly” judges steadily whittle 
away at our access to this vital and historic American institution of self-
government, the civil jury. 
The cost of this institution vanishing is high. We measure it in how often 
we are frustrated that political might makes right, how often we are frus-
trated that the voices of the wealthy and powerful fill the halls of govern-
ment, and how often we are frustrated that lost causes pile up against 
bulwarks of well-kept indifference. 
I’ll spot you that juries can be a thorn in the side of some and can some-
times be inconvenient. They do take some effort. They require care and 
feeding, both figuratively and literally. But I think that an institution that 
makes popular sovereignty real, an institution that checks the encroach-
ments of the wealthy and powerful, an institution that will listen when the 
ears of the other branches of government are deaf to you, and an institution 
 
20 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *380. 
21 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
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that brings ordinary Americans together to make important decisions in 
their community—that’s an institution that is well worth all the trouble. 
I think we should chart our course by the star our Founders followed and 
not tread the low path of efficiency, convenience, and accommodation. For 
the larger purposes and values our Founders fought for when they built us 
this goodly heritage, we should do everything we can to bring the American 
civil jury roaring back to life. I humbly propose that the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure should support that endeavor. 
Thank you very much. 
 
